Complementarity of Waiting Periods and Risk Caps in Paternalistic Policy
An experimental finding on how rule-makers combine soft- and hard-paternalistic policy tools. Using a Choice-Architect design in which rule-makers set a cap on risk-taking and optionally a mandatory waiting period over a high-stakes risky choice, it shows that giving decision-makers time to deliberate does not lower the caps imposed, and that endogenously chosen waiting periods add to rather than replace caps. The two tools therefore act as complements that target different parts of the decision-maker distribution rather than as substitutes.
Paternalism and Deliberation: An Experiment on Making Formal Rules Max R. P. Grossmann* January 3
This experimental-economics study examines whether two policy tools for restricting risky choices act as substitutes or complements: a soft-paternalistic mandatory waiting period and a hard-paternali…