In democratic theory, majority rule is examined as a candidate mechanism for conferring legitimacy on collective decisions, distinct from the metaphysical claim that it reveals a unified "general will." Social choice theory (Condorcet's paradox, Arrow's impossibility theorem, Kramer's agenda-manipulation result) shows that majority decisions over three or more alternatives can be cyclical, order-dependent, and manipulable, undermining any claim that majority outcomes track a coherent collective preference. Alternative justifications—Locke's power-based consent argument, Buchanan and Tullock's cost-minimization calculus (external costs versus decision-making costs) behind a veil of ignorance, the Rae–Barry status-quo-neutrality critique, and Schumpeter's competitive-elite model of democracy as market-like competition for votes—instead ground majority rule in minimizing domination and disciplining political elites through competitive accountability rather than in identifying a substantive collective will.
In democratic theory, majority rule is examined as a candidate mechanism for conferring legitimacy on collective decisions, distinct from the metaphysical claim that it reveals a unified "general wil…