The core theoretical framework establishes that security proofs for Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEM) utilizing hash functions can be formalized within the Random Oracle Model (ROM), where these primitives function as idealized random functions accessible to all entities including adversaries. In this domain, cryptographic reductions transform an adversary's advantage in breaking a KEM under Ind-CPA or Ind-CCA security into the computational hardness of underlying problems such as the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem or the One-Wayness of RSA generators, explicitly incorporating queries made to the random oracle. This abstraction belongs to theoretical cryptography and serves as a paradigm for justifying the security of practical public-key encryption schemes by bounding breaking probabilities against idealized assumptions rather than specific algorithmic implementations.
The core theoretical framework establishes that security proofs for Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEM) utilizing hash functions can be formalized within the Random Oracle Model (ROM), where these pri…