Rawls's difference principle (maximin) holds that just distributive arrangements are those that maximize the position of the least-advantaged group, a standard that is underdetermined with respect to specific political-economic systems (compatible with either market or redistributive arrangements) since it evaluates outcomes only by the size of the worst-off share, not by who holds it. The mature Rawls's "political, not metaphysical" turn — closely related to the concept of an "overlapping consensus" or "incompletely theorized agreement" — abandons the earlier neo-Kantian aspiration to derive a uniquely correct, universally rationally-compelled theory of justice, instead seeking only the shared political conclusions that people holding irreconcilable metaphysical, religious, or ethical worldviews can jointly affirm, without requiring agreement on their underlying reasons. This body of theory belongs to political philosophy, specifically social contract theory and theories of distributive justice, and marks a retreat from the early Enlightenment commitment to grounding political principles in reason and science understood as yielding certain, universally compelling conclusions.
Rawls's difference principle (maximin) holds that just distributive arrangements are those that maximize the position of the least-advantaged group, a standard that is underdetermined with respect to…